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SPEECH  BY  CHRISTOPHER  TUGENDHATJ  VICE-PRESIDENT  OF 
THE  COM~1ISSION OF  THE  EUROPEAN  COMt~UNITIESJ  TO  THE 
MANCHESTER  LITERARY  AND  PHILOSOPHICAL  SOCIETY., 
AT  f1ANCHESTER.,  25  FEBRUARY  1982  AT  21.30  HOURS 
BRITAIN  AND  EUROPE:  LESSONS  FOR  THE  EIGHTIES 
The  Manchester  Literary  and  Philosopt11cal  Society 
can  consider  the  question  of  Britain  and  Europe 
' 
in  the  1980's  in  an  appropriate  historical  context. 
' 
When  your  society  was  founded  Just  over  200  years 
'"  agoJ  only  four  of  the  present  ten  members  of  tile  ,. 
European  CommunitY  were  sovereign  states and  none 
had  the  same  frontiers  as  today.  The  Americans' 
were  fighting  to  secure  their  independence  and  the 
French  Revolution  was  still a few  years  away,  Since 
then.,  the  great  European  empires  have  risen  and 
disappeared  and  Europe  has  torn  itself apart  in  two 
~vor 1  d wars . 
I  Against .:.  2 -
Against  this  background~  you  can  assess 
both  the  and  failures  of  the  European 
Community  in  the  25  years  since  the  Treaty  of  Rome 
and  the  10  s1  Britain  signed  the  Accession  ~ 
Treaty. 
,,. 
The  successes  have  been  considerable. 
Old  t1  been  buried  and  new  friendships 
forged  toms  Union  and  the  Common  Market 
have  p  ayed  a vital  role  in  helping  Europe  to 
achl  levels  of prosperity  that  stand  comparison 
wit  despite  North  America's  infinitely 
greater  endowment  of  natural  resources.  The  Common 
Agricultural  1 cy  has  eliminated  fears  of  food 
shor"'" 
Europe 
although  these  are  endemic  in  Eastern 
external  trade  policY  enables 
Member  St  negotlat2  8S  one  in  international 
trading  matters  defend  their  common  Interests. 
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absence 
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Wi 
But  there  are  also  Important  areas  in 
1tY  has  failed  to  come  to  grips  wtth 
r  common  policies.  Two  stand  out:  the 
a  le  monetary  framework  and  the 
ernal  foreign  policy  comparable 
2rnal  trade  policy. 
!"  The  need  for 
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The  need  for  progress  on  the  monetary  front 
was  highlighted  last year  by  the  gyrations  of  u.s. 
interest  rates-and  of  the  u.s.  dollar  and  the 
effects  they  had  on  all  European  economies~  not 
least  our  own.  Recent  events  on  the  other  side  of  ·~ 
the  Atlantic  suggest  that  we  will  have  similar 
.. 
problems  again  this  year  and  that  they  will  be  even 
more  difficult  to  contend  wtth.  I have  spoken  elsewhere 
on  the  need  for  Britain  to  participate  In the  European 
Monetary  System  and  for  that  system  to  be  further 
developed.  On  this  occasion~  I would  only  add  that 
it is  becoming  increasingly  difficult to  understand 
why  Britain  does  not  do  so.  On  the  one  hand~  the 
British authorities  are  following  an  active  exchange 
rate  policy  consistent  with  that  required  bY  the 
E.M.S.  On  the  other~ Britain  Is  co-operating  with  the 
other  European  countries  in  efforts  to  influence 
u.s.  pollcy  and  to  mitigate  its effects  on  our 
economies.  Both  the  internal  and  external  obJectives 
of  British  policy  would  be  served  bY  full  British 
part1cipatton  tn  the  E.M.S. 
TontghtJ  I want  to  put  the  case  for  developing 
a common  foreign  policy  to  the  point 
where  Europe  can  react  unitedlY  and  effectively 
to  international  crises.  Twice  already_1n  the  .. 
1980's  - over  Afgantstan  and  Poland  - we  have  seen 
:. I  what  happens  in what  happens  in 
Europe 
dangerous 
confusion 
the  various 
European  and 
Alliance.  If a 
11  es  .. 
we  shall 
not 
learn 
1  n 
t 
1  nexcusarJ 1  e, 
..  already  been 
the  EtH 
co-operation, 
to  co-·ordinat 
worked  ~1ell  n 
in1  lat1ves 
the 
Europe,  the  ~1 
on  I 
Pol 
the 
of  t 
pr  1 
---------------~~--- -----
- 4 -
~-. 
absence.  On  each  occasion, 
respond  until  after a 
se,  1t  was  thrown  into 
ons  opened  up  both  between 
countries  and  between  the 
wings  of  the  North  Atlantic 
' 
two  such  warnings  and  two  such 
11  to  take  remedial  action: 
disaster.  It  1s  bad  enough 
he  lessons  of  history;  not  t~ 
one's  6wn  decade  Is  surely 
ions  on  which  to  build  have  . 
Ever  since  1973,  the  members  of 
1  have  been  developing  political 
. procedure  for  working  together 
policy  is called.  It has 
of  relative calm  and  notable 
taken  over,  for  example, 
itY  and  Co-operation  in 
t,  the  imposition  of  sanctions 
ong  after  the  invasion  and 
.  At  the  United  Nations, 
together  more  than  80  % 
external  trade  policy 
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I  in  formal 
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tn  formal  negotiations  In  the  GATT~  in  Informal 
ministerial  gatherings  or  emergencies  such  as 
the  current  American  attempts  to  cut  off  steel 
imports  from  Europe~  the  Member  States  act  together  · 
through  the  Community, 
' 
The  rest  of  the  world  has  been  impressed 
and  now  thinks  of  us  more  and  more  as  one. 
Governments  outside  Europe  make  increasingly  less 
distinction  between  positions  of  individual  Member 
States  and  tend  rather  to  ask  "what  are  Europe's 
intentions  and  what  will  Europe  do?".  They  expect 
us  to  have  a united  position  and  are  surprised  and~ 
depending  who  they  are~  often  disappointed  when  we 
do  not. 
Against  this  background~ Europe's 
disunitY  and  disarray  over  Poland  come  as  a brutal 
shock.  The  doubts  and  divisions  were  so  great 
that  weeks  elapsed  before  the  first CommunitY 
policy  statement  could  be  issued  and  even  then  it was 
1mmedtately  disowned  by  Greece. 
The  first weeks  of  a crisis are  those  tn 
which  its pattern  ts  set.  It  is  formed  partly  1n 
response  to  what  happens  In  the  country  or  region 
concerned  and  partly  1n  response  to  external  reactions. 
I  If the  Member 
.-. 
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If the  Member  States.of the  CommunitY  cannot  react 
1n  time,  have  no  Immediate  influence. 
As  a result  those  whom  they  wish  to  aid  morally, 
materially  or  diplomaticallY  go  unaided  and  those 
whom  they  w  st1  influence,  be  lt their  American 
allies or 
surpr1s1ngl 
without  payl 
R  stans,  remain  uninfluenced.  Not 
they  proceed  In  their different  ways 
much  attention  to  Europe's  partic~lar 
concerns  and  interests. 
is  brings  me  to  my  central  point, 
Wt1  is  t  Member  States of  the  CommunitY 
al  ive  but  to  act  together  If they  are 
to  exert  much  Influence  on  what 'happens  in  the  world. 
e under  obligation  to  do  so.  They  are 
perfectlY  pursue  as  independent  a line  as 
they  wish.  the  scope  fJr  a medium-sized 
European  power  ing  alone  to  achieve  anything 
worthwhile  is  very  limited,  except  in 
except1  circumstances.  Moreover,  the  more 
discordant  points  of  view  of  the  individual 
Member  become,  the  more  they  will  cut 
be 
great  ally 
and  the  less  anyone  of  them  will 
1s  Is  as  true  when  dealing  with  our 
United  States  as  it is  of  the 
Unl  or  governments  in  the  Middle  East, 
Afr1  or  elsewhere. 
I  I am  particularly 
!  • "  ...  .  " 
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I am  particularly  worried  about  the 
effects of  Europe's  disunitY  and  tnab111tY  to 
respond  to  crises  on  our  relations  with  the 
United  States.  ·  The  ·North  At 1  ant 1  c A  111 ance 
is  of  fundamental  importance.  Without  it we 
would  be  lost  and  the  Americans  gravely  weakened. 
I-fear  that  if Europe  cannot  speak  wittfone  voice 
to  Washington  and  find  a way  of  responding  more 
qutcklY  and  unitedly  to  crises~  the  divisions 
in  the  Alliance  will  be  deepened  and  its 
effectiveness  increasingly  impaired. 
This  is  because  the  United  States  is 
..  simply  not  prepared  to  listen to' the  individual  ' 
European  states putting  forward  different  views~ 
to  take  them  Into  account  and  to  strike an 
appropriate  balance~  before  acting.  It will 
generally  listen politely  enough~  but  then  go 
its own  wayJ  like  a traveller  who  on  asking  a 
group  of  locals  for  guldanceJ  receives  muddled 
and  conflicting  advice  and  decides  that  he  had 
better  back  his  own  Judgement.  The  Europeans 
themselves  then  feel  resentful  that  their  views 
and  interests  have  not  been  fullY  taken  into 
account  while  the  Americans  feel  impatient  with 
'· 
the  subsequent  criticism and  lack  of  "follower-ship" 
-
from  their  European  allies. 
I  Only  when 
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Only  when  speaking  with  one  voice  in 
support  of  a common  obJective  can  Europe  make  Its 
influence  felt  In  Washington.  When  1t  does  so~ 
it has  the  weight  and  authoritY  of  an  equal  and  a 
dialogue  between  equals  can  take  place.  As  in  any 
such  exchange  between  partners  who  wish  to  keep 
their  Joint  enterprise  going~  such  an  exchange  Is 
likely  to  lead  both  sides  to  adJust  their  positions 
in  order  to  find  a common  one.  For  their  part~ 
the  Americans  have  certainly  been  willing  to  do  so 
as  President  Reagan's  "zero  option"  speech  over  the 
disarmament  negotiations  on  Theatre  Nuclear  Forces 
shows. 
Such  adJustments  are  Very  important  for 
the  rH~alth of  the  Alliance  in  Europe .•..  At  presenL 
there  is  a widespread  feeling  on  this side  of  the 
Atlantic  that  NATO  Is  too  u~Jlnated by  the  Americans 
and  too  subservient  to  the1r  interests.  This 
feeling  provides  one  of  the  wells  from  which  the 
advocates  of  unilateral  nuclear  disarmament  and 
those  who  oppose  the  strengthening  of  Europe's 
nuclear  defences  through  the  deployment  of  Cruise  and 
• 
Perstli  3Sl  aw  their  support. 
I  Before  NATO 
!I 
't ... 
'  ..  .  ,. 
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Before  NATO  can  recover  the  popular 
support  In  Europe,  which  1t  needs,  the  peoples  of 
Europe  must  be  convinced  that  the  Alliance  1s  one 
between  equals  and  that  they  can  command  as  much 
attention  in  Washington  and  influence  over  the 
development  of  American  policy  as  applies  in  reverse. 
This  can  only  be  achieved  if the  countries  of  Europe 
operate  as  a unit  within  the  Alliance  as  General 
Eisenhower  called  on  us  to  do  30  years  ago. 
The  Community  should  also  be  capable  of  - brihgtng  diplomatic  Influence  to  bear  beyond  the  area 
covered  bY  the  Alliance  in  places  where  we  have  ~ 
interests at  stake  and  a contribution  to  make.  As 
a maJor  economic  power,  it would  be  selfish and 
irresponsible  to  cut  ourselves  off  from  the  rest  of 
...  ~ . 
the  world.  In  any  case,  we  cannot  do  so.  As  the 
largest  participant  in  international  trade,  our 
prosperity,  our  lnd~stries and  our  Jbbs  depend  on 
access  to  raw  materials  and  markets  throughout  the 
world.  Inevitably  therefore,  we  have  a stake  ln  the 
political  stab111tY  and  economic  health  of  those  with 
whom  we  are  linked.  In  many  areas  too,  those  economic 
links  are  buttressed  by  ties of  familY,  friendshlb 
and  historical  involvement. 
I  In  these  circumstances 
'  .. .. 
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1rcumstances~  it is  only  natural 
CommunitY  should  become  involved 
peace  In  the  Middle  East  and  in 
a group  of  three  Member 
together  with  the  American&  and 
t  to  achieve  a settlement  in 
economicallY  interdependant  with 
other  ties with  them  as  well. 
le  East  initiative is  sometimes 
n Europe  and  elsewhere  for 
s the  Camp  David  process 
1lure  to  bring  the 
together.  I  do  not  believe  the 
I 
true.  What  we  are  doing  should  be 
ementary  to  American  efforts~  not 
..  As  for  the  second  po1ntJ 
that  we  have  not  succeeded 
1ve  of  bring~ng  he  two 
,  But  had  it not  been  for  our 
lean  approach  has  sometimes 
I  wonder  whether  even  the  most 
governments  would  have  been  able  to 
'  lations  with  the  West~  which 
terests of  both  sides. 
I  What  should  be 
' 
•• What  should  be  surprising  is  not  that  we 
should  be  active  in  tile Middle  EasL  but  tl1at  we 
are  not  doing  more  as  a Community  both  there  and 
elsewhere.  I am  sure  that  tf any  of  the  great 
statesmen  who  controlled  their  own  countries' 
destinies  during  the  course  of  your  society's 
hfstory  could  now  be  transposed  to  the  CommunitY~ 
they  would  agree.  They  would  be  struck  by  the 
imbalance  between  the  degree  of  internal  economic 
co-operation  achieved  by  the  CommunitY  and  its 
lack  of  external  pol1t1cal  coherence.  They  might 
wonder  how  long  the  former  can  survive  without 
further  progess  on  the  latter. 
This  progress  must  be  on  a CommunitY 
basts.  In  this  field  as  In  others  the  concept  of 
Europe  "a  la  carte"  has  Its  attractions~ especiallY 
for  busy  heads  of  government  tmpatient"for  progress. 
It  means  that  those  Member  States  which  want  to 
work  together  on  something  and  are  ready  to  do  so 
can  move  ahead  without  waiting  for  others.  BY  the 
same  token~  those  that  have difficulty  In  relating 
to  a common  position  can  opt  out.  Obviously~  this 
is  much  easier  than  the  negotiations  and  compromises 
necessary  for  a policy  involving  all  Ten. 
I  But  the  "a  la~carte" 
' . - 12  -
But  the  ua  la  carte"  approach  leads 
directly  to  sort  of  confusion  among  the  countries 
of  Europe  and  dlvisi  between  the  European  and  -· 
American  wings  of  the  Alliance  from  which  we  should 
be  trying  to  It  would  mean  in  the  first 
instance  Member  States  participating  only  in 
lnitiatives that  tficallY  interest  them  and 
governments  tend!  work  only  with  those  of 
their  partners  with  whom  co-operation  comes  easily. 
Thereafter~  the  itY  would  quicklY  disintegrate 
into  a collecti  shifting alliancesJ  which 
would  all  too  1  ind  thems~lves  ~n contention 
with  each  other  some  issues  some  countries 
would  find  themsel  s alone.  The  gap  that  the 
Polish  cri.sis 
other  Eur 
the  United  States; 
between  Germany  and  some 
and  between  Germany  and 
...  ·  ~ a glimpse  of  the 
sort  of  dangers  that  e at  the  end  of  this 
particul  road. 
In  short;  the  "a  la  carte"  approach  ~ 
would  mean  that  the  opportunitY  that  now  exists 
for  deve  1  a  ent  set  of  obJectives  and 
the  means  for  working  towJrds  them  would  be  lost. 
So  too  ld  establishing  a firm 
basts  fr  which  t  a specificallY  European 
influence  world. 
I  The  Americans 
• t .. 
- 1~ - ~' 
The  Americans  would  dra\t  the  conclusion 
that  we  are  incapable  of  working  together  to  the 
extent  required  to  attain our  full  potential  as 
allies:  they  might  even  conclude  that  as  disunited 
entities~  we  are  most  of  us  not  worth  a great  deal 
anyway.  In eitl1er  case~  those  in  Washington  who 
atgue  that  there  is  no  point  in  co-ordlnatlng 
with  the  Europeans  and  that  the  single-minded 
pursuit  of  purely  American  interests  Is  all  that 
matters  would  be  strengthened.  Other  governments~ 
whether  in  Moscow  or  the  Tbird  World~  would  draw 
their  own  depressing  conclusions  about  the  need 
to  heed  Europe's  warnings  or  to  take  account  of 
European  interests  where  those  differ  from  the 
United  States.  All  too  often  they  would  decide  not 
to  bother  about  them  at  all. 
This  is  not  the  occasion  on  which  to  spell 
out  the  network  of  committees  and  procedures 
involving  ministers  and  officials that  will  be  needed 
to  reinforce  existing  Community  arrangements  in 
support  of  a European  fore 1  gn  po 11 cy.  In  any  case,  · 
it is  not  necessary.  The  London  Report  on  political 
co-operation  adopted  by  the  Council  of  Ministers 
last  October  provides  an  admirable  blueprint. 
I  It  ts  not  the  lack 
• t I  ... 
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the  lack  of  1nst1tut1onal 
holding  the  CommunitY  back~ 
for  improving  them. 
plans  and  proposals  for 
has  been  produced  1n 
large.  The  problem  Is 
.\·, 
years~  the  Member  States' 
layed  an  increasing  1nab111tY 
compromises  to  settle divisive 
1s  can  be  seen  over  such  diverse 
It  sh  Budget  contribution 
settlement~  fish.,  the  seat  o.f 
the  free  movem~nt of  agrtcultufal 
on  which  the  Enlargement  ~ 
n and  Portugal  should  be 
rna .. ·  s and  many  more  - . 
t  stubborn  defense  of  national 
the  search  for  a reasonable 
st of  the  CommunitY  as  a 
often  the  dominant  concern  of 
the  list shows  all  are  guilty 
I  David  Dilks 
.. - 15  -
David  Dilks  tells us  in  his  introduction 
tu  the  CadOQ3n  Diaries  that  when  the  League  of 
Nations  was  formed~ Sir  Alexander  Cadogan  warned 
against  establishing  a Committee  of  Permanent 
Representatives  from  each  Member  State  as  we  now 
have  In  the  CommunitY.  He  feared  they  would  be 
so  dedicated  to  the  individual  national  interests 
as  to  "become  a corps  of  professional  debaters~ 
carrying  out  their  instructions  to  the  letter 
and  developing  obstruction  into  a fine  art" .  .  ·. 
In  today's  CommunitY~  alas~  such  a description 
all  too  often  applies  as  much  to  the  Council  of 
Ministers  as  to  the  officials. 
There  are  those  who  c1aim  to  believe  that 
progresst~ards a common  approach  to  foreign  policy 
matters  can  take  place  against  such  a background. 
The  fact  of  the  matter  is  it cannot.  One  has 
only  to  think  of  the  extent  to  which  so  many  of 
the  recent  thrice-yearly  meetings  of  heads  of 
government  have  been  dominated  by  corrosive  . 
arguments  on  internal  matters  to  appreciate  this. 
To  expect  a common  foreign  policy  to  emerge 
from  such  a background  is  like  expecting  to  find 
a rose  garden  in  a desert. 
I  That  great  founding 
.. '  ~·  •  » 
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founding  father  of  modern 
c1  . "  the  Community  exists 
to  common  pr_oblems  ",  --
which  its early  achievements 
nspiration  to  which  we  must 
1se  to  the  challenges 
ternatlonal  sphere. 
will~  I  fear~ sink  Into 
1ng  Irrelevance  as  the 
countries  of  Europe  will 
In  t t s p  1  ace  and  \1111  f 1  nd  · 
and  disunited  in  the. 
• t 